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Abstract 
 
  
This paper empirically investigates the short and long run impact of public 
debt on economic growth. We use annual data from both central and 
peripheral countries of the euro area (EA) for the 1961-2013 period and 
estimate a production function augmented with a debt stock term by applying 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach. Our 
results suggest different patterns across EA countries and tend to support 
the view that public debt always has a negative impact on the long-run 
performance of EA member states, whilst its short-run effect may be positive 
depending on the country.  
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1. Introduction 
The origin of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (EA) goes deeper than the fiscal 
imbalances in member states. Some authors have pointed out that the EA faced three 
interlocking crises – banking, sovereign debt, and economic growth – which together 
challenged the viability of the currency union (Shambaugh, 2012). According to this line of 
thought, these crises connected with one another in several ways: the problems of weak 
banks and high sovereign debt were mutually reinforcing, and both were exacerbated by 
weak, constrained growth. Despite its relevance, an analysis of the interrelationship 
between sovereign and banking risk is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, since the 
crisis led to an unprecedented increase in sovereign debt in EA countries1 we will focus on 
the interconnection between sovereign debt and growth in 11 of them, both central 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral member 
states (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). There is a widespread consensus on the 
potentially adverse consequences of high levels of public debt for these countries’ 
economic growth, but few macroeconomic policy debates have caused as much 
disagreement as the current austerity argument. 
Overall, the theoretical literature favours the study of the effects of very high debt on the 
capital stock, growth, and risk, since it tends to point to a negative link between the public 
debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio and the steady-state growth rate of GDP 
(see, for instance, Aizenman et al., 2007). However, it also stresses not only that the impact 
of debt on output may differ depending on the time horizon − while debt may crowd out 
capital and reduce output in the long run, in the short run it can stimulate aggregate 
demand and output [see Barro (1990), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) or Salotti and 
Trecroci (2016)] − but also that the presence of a tipping point, above which an increase in 
                                                             
1 By the end of 2013, on average, public debt reached about 100% of GDP in EA countries – its highest level in 50 years. 
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public debt has a detrimental effect on economic performance, does not mean that it has to 
be common across countries [see Ghosh et al. (2013), Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) or 
Ahlborn and Schweickert (2016)]. Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) indicate that there may 
be at least three reasons for the differences in the relationships between public debt and 
growth across countries. First, production technology may differ, and thus also the 
relationship between debt and growth. Second, the capacity to tolerate high levels of debt 
may depend on a number of country-specific characteristics, related to past crises and to 
the macro and institutional framework. Third, vulnerability to public debt may depend not 
only on debt levels, but also on debt composition (domestic versus external, foreign or 
domestic currency denominated or long-term versus short term), which may also differ 
significantly across countries. 
Nevertheless, although the relevance of the heterogeneity of the debt-growth nexus (both 
across countries and time periods) has been stressed by the literature, and although certain 
authors have presented empirical analyses of this issue, hardly any empirical studies have 
examined the topic in EA countries. While there is a substantial body of research exploring 
the interconnection between debt and growth in both developed and emerging countries, 
few papers to date have looked at this link in the context of the EA. These exceptions 
make use of panel data techniques to obtaining average results for EA countries, and do 
not distinguish between countries or between short and long run effects.  
In this context, this paper presents a new approach to add to the as yet small body of 
literature on the relationship between public debt accumulation and economic performance 
in EA countries, by examining the potential heterogeneity in the debt-growth nexus both 
across different EA countries and across time horizons. Therefore, our contribution to the 
empirical literature is twofold. First, unlike previous studies, we do not make use of panel 
estimation techniques to combine the power of cross section averaging with all the 
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subtleties of temporal dependence; rather, we explore the time series dimension of the 
issue to obtain further evidence based on the historical experience of each country in the 
sample in order to detect potential heterogeneities in the relationship across EA countries. 
Second, our econometric methodology is data-driven, and it allows us to select the 
statistical model that best approximates the relationship between the variables under study 
for any particular country and to assess both the short and long-run effects of public debt 
on output performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 justifies our empirical approach on 
the basis of a review of the existing literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework 
of the analysis and outlines the econometric methodology. Section 4 describes our data. 
Empirical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and 
offers some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review 
Under what conditions is debt growth-enhancing? This challenging question has been 
studied by economists for a long time, but has recently undergone a notable revival fuelled 
by the substantial deterioration of public finances in many economies as a result of the 
financial and economic crisis of 2008-20092.  
From the theoretical perspective, there is no consensus regarding the sign of the impact of 
public debt on output in either the short or the long run. The “conventional” view 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999) states that in the short run, since output is demand-
determined, government debt (manifesting deficit financing) can have a positive effect on 
disposable income, aggregate demand, and overall output. Moderate levels of debt are 
found to have a positive short-run impact on economic growth through a range of 
                                                             
2 During the crisis, public deficits increased not only because economic automatic stabilizers began to work (which meant, 
for instance, declining revenues) but also because of the launch of fiscal stimulus packages.  
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channels: improved monetary policy, strengthened institutions, enhanced private savings, 
deepened financial intermediation (Abbas and Christensen, 2007) or smoothed 
distortionary taxation over time (Barro, 1979). This positive short-run effect of budget 
deficits (and higher debt) is likely to be large when the output is far from capacity. 
However, things are different in the long run if the decrease in public savings brought 
about by a higher budget deficit is not fully compensated by an increase in private savings. 
In this situation, national savings will decrease and total investment will fall; this will have a 
negative effect on GDP as it will reduce capital stock, increase interest rates, and reduce 
labour productivity and wages. The negative effect of an increase in public debt on future 
GDP can be amplified if high public debt increases uncertainty or leads to expectations of 
future confiscation, possibly through inflation and financial repression (see Cochrane, 
2011).  
The above “conventional” split between the short and long-run effects of debt disregards 
the fact that protracted recessions may reduce future potential output (as they increase the 
number of discouraged workers, with the associated loss of skills, and have a negative 
effect on organizational capital and investment in new activities). There is, in fact, evidence 
that recessions have a permanent effect on the level of future GDP (see, e.g., Cerra and 
Saxena, 2008), which implies that running fiscal deficits (and increasing debt) may have a 
positive effect on output in both the short and the long run. DeLong and Summers (2012) 
argue that, in a low interest rate environment, an expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be 
self-financing.  
Finally, another strand of the literature also departs from the “conventional” view and 
establishes a link between the long-term effect of debt and the kind of public expenditure it 
funds. The papers by Devarajan et al. (1996) and Aschauer (1989), for instance, state that in 
the long run, the impact of debt on the economy’s performance depends on whether the 
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public expenditure funded by government debt is productive or unproductive. Whilst the 
former (which includes physical infrastructure such as roads and railways, communication, 
information systems such as phone, internet, and education)3 may have a positive impact 
on the economy’s growth, the latter does not affect the economy’s long-run performance, 
although it may have positive short-run implications. 
From the empirical perspective, the results from the literature on the relationship between 
public debt and economic growth are far from conclusive either [see Panizza and 
Presbitero (2013) or the technical Appendix in Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) for two 
excellent summaries of this literature]. Some authors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010 or Pattillo 
et al., 2011) present empirical evidence indicating that the relationship is described by an 
inverted U-shaped pattern (low levels of public debt positively affect economic growth, but 
high levels have a negative impact).4 However, other empirical studies reach very different 
conclusions. While some of them find no evidence for a robust effect of debt on growth 
(Lof and Malinen, 2014), others detect an inverse relationship between the two variables 
(Woo and Koomar, 2015) or contend that the relationship between them is mitigated 
crucially by the quality of a country’s institutions (Kourtellos et al., 2013). 
In the EA context, in a situation in which leverage was already very high5, the recent 
economic recession and sovereign debt crisis has stimulated an intense debate both on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies and on the possible adverse consequences of the 
accumulation of public debt in EA countries. Few macroeconomic policy debates have 
                                                             
3 Although this sort of investment might not be profitable from the point of view of the single firm (as private costs 
exceed private returns), the whole economy would nevertheless benefit enormously, which justifies public provision. For 
instance, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), among others, contend that both government infrastructure investment and 
education expenditures have a significant impact on an economy’s long-term growth rate.  
4 In particular, in their seminal paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggest that growth rates decrease substantially when 
debt-to-GDP ratios are above the 90% threshold. 
5 In this regard, Gómez-Puig (2013) attempts to quantify the total level of indebtedness (public and private) in all EA 
countries, using a database created with the statistics provided by the European Central Bank. According to her 
calculations, in September 2012, total leverage (public and private) over GDP recorded levels of 710%, 487%, 413%, 
360% and 353% in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece respectively.  
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generated as much controversy as the current austerity argument, not only because pundits 
draw widely different conclusions for macroeconomic policy (in particular, in relation to 
their positions on economic austerity policies), but also because economists have not 
reached a consensus (see Alesina et al. 2015). Some suggest that now is precisely the time to 
apply the lessons learnt during the Great Depression and that policymakers should 
implement expansionary fiscal policies [see, among others, Krugman (2011), Berg and 
Ostry (2011) or DeLong and Summers (2012)]6 since fiscal austerity may have been the 
main culprit for the recessions experienced by European countries; others argue that, since 
the high level of public sector leverage has a negative effect on economic growth, fiscal 
consolidation is fundamental to restoring confidence and improving expectations about the 
future evolution of the economy and therefore its rate of growth [see Cochrane (2011),    
Teles and Mussolini (2014) and Castro et al.(2015), to name just a few]7.  
In our reading of the empirical evidence, few papers have examined the relationship 
between debt and growth for EA countries despite the effects of the severe sovereign debt 
crisis in several member states. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and Baum et al. 
(2013) analyse the non-linearities of the debt-growth nexus estimating a standard growth 
model and employing a panel approach. In contrast, Dreger and Reimers (2013) base their 
analysis on the distinction between sustainable and non-sustainable debt periods. These 
three studies are unified and extended by Antonakakis (2014). Like the other authors he 
uses a panel approach, but in addition to debt non-linearities, he also examines the effect of 
debt sustainability on economic growth in the EA. Overall, this empirical literature lends 
                                                             
6 These authors state that deleveraging policies may even prove to be detrimental, depending on the fundamental 
variables of the economy. Their argument is currently supported by some politicians in southern Europe.  
7 The latter approach, which supports austerity measures, has been highly influential among the EA authorities and is 
supported by the empirical evidence presented in some influential papers (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, among them).  
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support to the presence of a common debt threshold across (similar) countries like those in 
the EA, and does not distinguish between short- and-long run effects.  
Therefore, to our knowledge, no strong case has yet been made for analysing the effect of 
debt accumulation on economic growth taking into account the particular characteristics of 
each EA economy and examining whether the effects differ depending on the time 
horizon, in spite of the fact that this potential heterogeneity has been stressed by the 
literature. For instance, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) and Égert (2015) support the 
existence of nonlinearity in the debt-growth nexus, but state that there is no evidence at all 
for a threshold level common to all countries over time; while Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2015) and Donayre and Taivan (2017), who analyse the causal relationship between 
public debt and economic growth, also suggest that the causal link is intrinsic to each 
country. 
3. Analytical framework and econometric methodology 
An important line of research, based on the empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004), has considered growth regressions augmented by public debt to assess 
whether the latter has an impact on growth over and above other determinants − 
population growth, human capital, financial development, innovation intensity, openness to 
trade, fiscal indicators, saving or investment rate and macroeconomic uncertainty, to name 
just a few − (see, e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2011; Pattillo et al., 2011; or Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother, 2012)  
Our empirical strategy departs from this approach and explores the debt–growth nexus 
using an aggregate production function augmented by adding a debt variable. This allows 
us to test the impact of debt after controlling for the basic drivers of growth: the stock of 
physical capital, the labour input and a measure of human capital. The stock of physical 
8 
 
capital and the labour input have been the two key determinants of economic growth since 
Solow’s classic model (1956) and many empirical studies have examined their relationship 
with economic growth (see, e.g., Frankel, 1962). Regarding human capital, Becker (1962) 
stated that investment in human capital contributed to economic growth by investing in 
people through education and health, and Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented the Solow model 
by including accumulation of human as well as physical capital (see Savvide and Stengos, 
2009). 
Therefore, we extend Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015)’s approach and consider the 
following aggregate production function, in which public debt is included as a separate 
factor of production8: 
( , , , )t t t t tY AF K L H D     (1) 
where Y is the level of output, A is an index of technological progress, K is the stock of 
physical capital, L is the labour input, H is the human capital, and D is the stock of public 
debt.   
For simplicity, the technology is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form:  
31 2 4
t t t t tY AK L H D
        (2) 
so that, after taking logs and denominating by a small letter the log of its corresponding 
capital letter, we obtain 
1 2 3 4t t t t ty k l h d            (3) 
As can be seen, equation (3) postulates a long-run relationship between (the log of) the 
level of production (yt), (the log of) the stock of physical capital (kt), (the log of) the labour 
                                                             
8 Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) do not consider H in the basic equation of interest for their analysis of the debt–
growth nexus. 
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employed (lt), (the log of) the human capital (ht) and (the log of) the stock of public debt 
(dt). In contrast to Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), we do not impose any constraint 
regarding the returns to scale of production factors in the production function. 
Equation (3) can be estimated from sufficiently long time series by cointegration 
econometric techniques. In this paper we make use of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). This approach presents at least three significant 
advantages over the two alternatives commonly used in the empirical literature: the single-
equation procedure developed by Engle and Granger (1987) and the maximum likelihood 
method postulated by Johansen (1991, 1995) which is based on a system of equations. 
First, both these approaches require the variables under study to be integrated of order 1; 
this inevitably requires a previous process of tests on the order of integration of the series, 
which may lead to some uncertainty in the analysis of long-run relations. In contrast, the 
ARDL bounds testing approach allows the analysis of long-term relationships between 
variables, regardless of whether they are integrated of order 0 [I(0)], of order 1 [I(1)] or 
mutually cointegrated. This avoids some of the common pitfalls faced in the empirical 
analysis of time series, such as the lack of power of unit root tests and doubts about the 
order of integration of the variables examined (Pesaran et al., 2001). Second, the ARDL 
bounds testing approach allows a distinction to be made between the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables, an obvious advantage over the method proposed by Engle 
and Granger; at the same time, like the Johansen approach, it allows simultaneous 
estimation of the short-run and long-run components, eliminating the problems associated 
with omitted variables and the presence of autocorrelation. Finally, while the estimation 
results obtained by the methods proposed by Engle and Granger and Johansen are not 
robust to small samples, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the short-run parameters 
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estimated using their approach are T  consistent and that the long-run parameters are 
super-consistent in small samples. 
In our particular case, the application of the ARDL approach to cointegration involves 
estimating the following unrestricted error correction model (UECM): 
31 2 4
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
qq q qp
t i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i i i
t t t t t t
y y k l h d
y k l h d
     
     
    
    
    
            
     
    
  (4) 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator, β is the drift component, and εt is assumed 
to be a white noise process. Note that p is the number of lags of the dependent variable 
and qi is the number of lags of the i-th explanatory variable. The optimal lag structure of the 
first differenced regression (4) is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) to simultaneously correct for residual serial 
correlation and the problem of endogenous regressors (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p. 386). In 
order to determine the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables under 
study, Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) propose two alternative tests. First, an F-statistic is 
used to test the joint significance of the first lag of the variables in levels used in the 
analysis (i.e. 1 2 3 4 5 0         ), and then  a t-statistic is used to test the individual 
significance of the lagged dependent variable in levels (i. e. 1 0  ).  
Based on two sets of critical values: I(0) and I(1) (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 2001), if the 
calculated F-or t-statistics exceed the upper bound I(1), we conclude in favour of a long-run 
relationship, regardless of the order of integration. However, if these statistics are below 
the lower bound I(0), the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Finally, if 
the calculated F- and t-statistics fall between the lower and the upper bound, the results are 
inconclusive.  
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If cointegration exists, the conditional long-run model is derived from the reduced form 
equation (4) when the series in first differences are jointly equal to zero (i. e., Δy=Δk= 
Δl=Δd=0). The calculation of these estimated long-run coefficients is given by: 
1 2 3 4 5t t t t t ty k l h d               (5) 
Finally, if a long-run relation is found, an error correction representation exists which is 
estimated from the following reduced form equation: 
31 2 4
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
qq q qp
t i t i t i t i t i t t
i i i i i
y y k l h d ECM          
    
                (6) 
4. Data 
We estimate equation (4) with annual data for eleven EA countries: both central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral member states 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain)9. Even though the ARDL-based estimation 
procedure used in the paper can be reliably used in small samples, we use long spans of 
data covering the period 1961-2013 (i.e., a total of 52 annual observations) to explore the 
dimension of historical specificity and to capture the long-run relationship associated with 
the concept of cointegration (see, e. g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991). 
                                                             
9 This distinction between European central and peripheral countries has been used extensively in the empirical literature. 
The two groups we consider correspond roughly to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between 
those countries whose currencies continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception and which maintained broadly stable bilateral exchange rates with each other over the sample period, and those 
countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended their participation in the ERM, as well as 
fluctuating widely in value relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the ones found in Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1996), who applied multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators, 
to form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same as the ones found in 
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to economic agents’ perceptions of the commitment to maintain the exchange 
rate around a central parity in the ERM, and those identified by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2012) using 
cluster analysis when analysing permanent and transitory volatilities of EA sovereign yields. More recently, Belke et al. 
(2016) use the same division of core and peripheral countries to examine business cycle synchronization in the EA. 
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To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of 11 countries over the course 
of five decades, our primary source is the European Commission´s AMECO database10.  
We then strengthen our data with the use of supplementary data sourced from 
International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics) and the World Bank 
(World Development Indicators). We use GDP, net capital stock and public debt (all 
expressed at 2010 market prices) for Y, K and D, as well as civilian employment and life 
expectancy at birth for L and H11. The precise definitions and sources of the variables are 
given in Appendix 1. 
5. Empirical Results12 
5.1. Time series properties 
Before carrying out the ARDL cointegration exercise, we test for the order of integration 
of the variables by means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. This is necessary 
just to ensure that none of our variables are only stationary at second differences, since the 
ARDL bounds test fails to provide robust results in the presence of I(2) variables. The 
results decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, suggesting that all variables 
can be treated as first-difference stationary13. Then, following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) 
                                                             
10 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm 
11As explained in Appendix 1, following Sachs and Warner (1997), we use life expectancy at birth as the human-capital 
proxy. Other proxies commonly used for human capital such as years of secondary education, enrolment at secondary 
school and measures of human capital using a Mincerian equation (e. g. Morrisson and Murtin, 2007) were available on 
homogenous form for all EA countries under study only from 1980. Additionally, the proxy years of secondary education 
did not change during the sample period. As shown in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), longer life expectancy 
encourages human capital accumulation, since a longer time horizon increases the value of investments that pay out over 
time. Moreover, better health and greater education are complementary with longer life expectancy (Becker, 2007). We 
also considered the index of human capital per person provided by the Penn World Table (version 8.0, Feenstra et al., 
2013), based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). This index is 
only available until 2011 and, for the countries under study, is a I(2) variable that cannot be included in our analysis. 
Nevertheless, life expectancy at birth correlates strongly with the index of human capital per person during the 1961-2011 
period. 
12 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities and focusing on public debt. The reader is asked to 
browse through Tables 1 to 3 and Appendix 2 to find evidence for a particular country of her/his special interest.  
13 These results (not shown here in order to save space, but available from the authors upon request) were confirmed 
using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) 
Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of high 
persistence. These additional results are also available from the authors. 
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suggestion, we confirm these results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, 
where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root14. 
The single order of integration of the variables encourages the application of the ARDL 
bounds testing approach to examine the long-run relationship between the variables. 
5.2. Empirical results from the ARDL bounds test 
The estimation proceeds in stages. In the first stage, we specify the optimal lag length for 
the model (in this stage, we impose the same number of lags on all variables as in Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith, 2001). The ARDL representation does not require symmetry of lag 
lengths; each variable may have a different number of lag terms. As mentioned above, we 
use the AIC and SBC information criteria to guide our choice of the lag length, selecting 4 
as the maximum number of lags both for the dependent variable and the regressors. For 
the test of serial correlation in the residual, we use the maximum likelihood statistics for the 
first and fourth autocorrelation, denoted as χ2SC(1) and χ
2
SC(4) respectively. Due to 
constraints of space, these results are not shown here but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
Next we test for the existence of a long-run relation between the output and its 
components, as suggested by equation (3).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A in Table 1 gives the values of the F- and t-statistics for the case of unrestricted 
intercepts and no trends (case III in Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001)15. These statistics are 
                                                             
14 The results are not shown here due to space restrictions but are available from the authors upon request. 
15 Since the hypothesis of the expected values of the first differences of the series is equal to zero cannot be rejected, 
there is no evidence of linear deterministic trends in the data. Therefore, we conclude that the cointegrating relationship 
should be formulated with the constant term unrestricted and without deterministic trend terms (case III). Nevertheless, 
we also consider two additional scenarios for the deterministics: unrestricted intercepts, restricted trends; and unrestricted 
intercepts, unrestricted trends (cases IV and V in Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). These additional results are not shown 
here due to space constraints, but they are available from the authors upon request. Our estimation results indicate that 
the intercepts are always statistically significant, whereas the trends are not.    
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compared with the critical value bounds provided in Tables CI and CII of Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (2001) and depend on whether an intercept and/or trend is included in the 
estimations, suggesting the existence of a single long-term relationship in which the 
production level would be the dependent variable and the stock of physical capital, the 
labour employed, the human capital and the stock of public debt the independent variables.  
Then, the estimated long-run relationships between the variables are reported in Panel B in 
Table 1.  
Some very interesting results can be drawn from the empirical evidence presented in Table 
1. First, the long-term effect of debt on economic performance is in line with the findings 
in previous empirical literature based on panel data techniques, since it registers a negative 
value in all EA countries. However, the magnitude of the negative impact differs 
significantly across countries, implying that our conclusions need to be qualified. While 
comparatively high impacts are estimated in the case of France (-0.544), Portugal (-0.354), 
Spain (-0.336), and Austria (-0.129), in the rest of countries, although negative, the 
magnitude is very small with values close to zero. Ireland (-0.049), Finland (-0.049) and 
Germany (-0.040) are the countries with the lowest negative impact. Therefore, our results 
suggest that, even though debt has a long run negative impact on output in all EA 
countries, with the exception of France, Portugal, Spain and Austria its magnitude is 
negligible. 
In order to examine the short-term dynamics of the model, we estimate an error-correction 
model associated with the above long-run relationship. As can be seen in Table 2, the 
short-run impact of debt on economic performance differs clearly across countries, both in 
terms of the estimated coefficients for Δdt and in terms of the significance of lagged terms 
of Δdt. In order to compare results, we follow Hendry (1995)’s suggestion and calculate the 
short-term effects of debt on growth as follows for the significant coefficients:  
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short-term effects=  
4
1 1
/ (1 )
q p
i i
i i
 
 
     (7) 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 shows that with respect to peripheral EA countries, in spite of the important long- 
run negative impact in Portugal and Spain, the short-term effect is positive (0.063 and 
0.067), although quite small. However, in Greece, Ireland and Italy an increase in public 
debt has a negative effect on GDP, not only in the long run but in the short run as well. 
Among central EA countries, it is noticeable that in Germany and Finland the effect of 
public debt on GDP is positive in the short run (0.375 and 0.059) despite the negative 
(though very small) effect in the long run. Finally, in the case of Austria, Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands our results suggest that public debt has a negative impact on economic 
activity in both the short and the long run.  
All in all, it should be noted that we do not find a positive long-run relationship between 
public debt and output in any country, although the short-run link is positive in four EA 
countries. Interestingly, in two peripheral countries, Spain and Portugal, while debt exerts 
an important negative effect on the long run, its impact, although small, is positive in the 
short run. These results are in line with some recent literature which has investigated how 
different country characteristics (e.g., the state of the public finances, the health of the 
financial sector or the degree of openness to trade) might influence the size of fiscal 
multipliers. In particular, Corsetti et al. (2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that negative 
multipliers can be observed in high-debt countries (i.e., with debt-to-GDP ratios above 
60%), but they could be much larger in countries under sound public finances. 
Furthermore, Eberhart and Presbitero (2015) stress that one of the reasons that explains 
the differences in the relationships between public debt and growth across countries is the 
dependence of vulnerability to public debt on current debt levels. Among peripheral EA 
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countries, only Portugal and Spain registered an average debt ratio below the 60% 
threshold during the 1961-2013 period (37% and 35% respectively), while the debt ratio 
was also moderate in Finland and Germany (28% and 40% on average). Therefore, our 
results confirm that in countries with low or moderate indebtedness levels (i.e., in a 
sustainable public debt context, see Dreger and Reiners, 2013), an additional increase in 
public debt might exert a short-run positive effect on GDP. These findings are highly 
relevant since these two peripheral countries have been hit especially hard by both the 
economic and sovereign debt crises. And, amid the crisis, they received rescue packages (in 
the Spanish case, to save its banking sector) which were conditional on the implementation 
of structural reforms to improve competitiveness and highly controversial fiscal austerity 
measures (whose positive effects are nevertheless typically related to the long run). 
Although our results must be regarded with caution since they present the average effects 
over the 50 year estimated period, they do not seem to favour the same austerity argument 
in all EA countries. In particular, they indicate that, in the short term, expansionary fiscal 
policies may not have a negative effect on output – but a marginal positive one − in some 
countries such as Spain and Portugal, regardless of its large negative impact in the long run. 
Then, although our findings support the view that the unprecedented sovereign debt levels 
reached in EA countries might have adverse consequences for their economies in the long 
run, they also suggest that the pace of adjustment may differ across these countries. In 
particular, within peripheral EA countries, policymakers should bear in mind that while the 
short-run impact of debt on economic performance is negative in Greece, Ireland and Italy, 
it is slightly positive in Spain and Portugal.  
Regarding the estimated coefficients for the error correction terms (ECMt-1) representing 
the speed of adjustment needed to restore equilibrium in the dynamic model following a 
disturbance, Table 2 shows that they range from -0.301 to -0.543 for the central countries 
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(suggesting that, with the exception of Belgium and the Netherlands,  more than half of the 
disequilibrium is corrected within one year), while ranging from -0.129 to -0.262 for the 
peripheral EA countries (suggesting relatively slow reactions to deviations from equilibrium 
and implying that short-term effects may dominate at longer horizons), corroborating the 
above results. Besides, the highly significant estimated error correction terms provide 
further support for the existence of stable long-run relationships such as those reported in 
Table 1 (Banerjee et al., 1998). 
Finally, as Table 2 indicates, the short-run analysis seems to pass diagnostic tests such as 
normality of error term, second-order residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (χ2N, 
χ2SC and χ
2
H respectively). The regressions fit reasonably well, with R
2 values ranging from 
0.625 for France to 0.895 for Finland. 
5.3. Empirical results from the stability analysis 
The estimated parameters presented in Table 2 are average values for the entire sample 
period (1961-2013) and do not take into account the possibility that they could change over 
time if a structural break occurred. Therefore, we also explore the possibility of multiple 
structural changes in the parameter relating the public debt variable to the real growth rate 
(ψt) in equation (6) by using the Bai and Perron (1998) test
16. The results (not shown here to 
save space, but available from the authors upon request) seem to suggest strongly that there 
are two structural breaks in each of the estimated models. The detected break dates and the 
associated levels of public debt-to-GDP ratio are displayed in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                             
16 Bai and Perron (1998) consider the estimation of multiple structural shifts in a linear model estimated by least squares. 
They propose some tests for structural changes and a selection procedure based on a sequence of tests to estimate 
consistently both the number of breaks and the induced structural regimes in a linear model. We follow their 
recommendation and use a trimming region of 15%. We allow the system to search for a maximum of five breaks, which 
is the largest permissible number according to the Bai and Perron procedure.  
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As can be seen, in all the countries under study, the first break point occurred before 1999 
(i.e., before the beginning of the EA). It is located in the seventies in four countries: (1) 
Belgium ,−with the starting of an interest snowball from 1977 that led to one of the largest 
increases in debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced economies (Mauro and Zilinsky, 2016), (2) 
Greece, when this country entered a period of stagflation, caused by the second oil shock 
of 1979 (Alogoskoufis, 2012), (3) Italy, after a currency crisis in a period of severe political 
instability (Lubitz, 1978), and (4) the Netherlands, following a major change in economic 
policy (OECD, 1979). It occurred in the eighties in five economies: (1) Austria, around the 
introduction of measures to deal with serious structural problems in public finances 
(Katterl and Köhler-Töglhofer, 2005), (2) France, after a period of fiscal consolidation that 
resulted in a stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio (Corsetti and  Roubini, 1991), (3) 
Germany, in the aftermath of the recession of 1983-1985 which introduced stagflation 
(Siebert, 2005), (4) Ireland, in a context of sustained real GDP expansion that lulled 
policymakers into a false sense of security regarding the sustainability of the revenues from 
cyclically sensitive taxes (Honohan, 2009), and (5) Portugal, marked by a second IMF-
supported stabilization program, 1983–1985. Finally, it took place in the nineties in the 
other two EA countries in our sample: (1) Finland, after experiencing a banking crisis in 
1991 that worsened the fiscal balance (Reinhart, 2009), and (2) Spain, coinciding with a 
severe economic crisis in 1993. Moreover, it is noticeable that the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
associated to the first break point surpasses the level of 60% only in Ireland (107%).  
Regarding the second break point, in all cases it took place after the implementation of the 
common currency and in eight out of the 11 cases under study it occurred in 2007 or later, 
coinciding with the global financial and economic crisis. Specifically, it took place in 2007 
(coinciding with the subprime crisis in the United States) in Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Italy; in 2008 (when Lehman Brothers collapsed) in Germany, Greece and the Netherlands; 
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and in 2009 (coinciding with the beginning of the EA sovereign crisis) in Spain17. However, 
in all countries but Spain, the second break date occurred before the economic recession 
reached its trough during the third regime, which pushed public debt up to unprecedented 
levels. Therefore, it can be observed that the associated debt-to-GDP ratio clearly increases 
in the second break point compared with the first one, presenting values of above 60% in 6 
out of the 11 countries under study. Specifically, it occurs at ratios marginally above that 
value in Austria, Germany and France; slightly above 90% in Belgium and above 100% in 
Italy and Greece.  
If we focus on peripheral EA countries, it can be observed that whilst in Spain and 
Portugal the public debt-to-GDP ratios associated with the two break dates are very similar 
(55% on average), in the other three countries they diverge significantly. As can be seen, in 
Greece the public debt-to-GDP ratio increases from 23% in the first break point (1979) to 
113% in the second one (2008). A similar pattern is found in Italy, where it rises from 56% 
in 1976 to 106% in 2007. Nonetheless, the behaviour in Ireland is completely different: the 
ratio was 107% at the first break point (1988) and decreased to 25% at the second one 
(2007), indicating that the substantial debt accumulation in 2007-2008 was preceded by a 
huge deleverage period in that country. 
Next, we utilize this information and form three regimes for each country. The idea is to 
re-estimate the regression model including a dummy variable that incorporates the detected 
breakpoints and gauge whether structural breaks have disturbed the effect of public debt 
on the real growth rate: 
31 2 4 4 4
1 2 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
qq q q q qp
t i t i t i t i t i t i t t i t t t
i i i i i i i
y y k l h d d D d D ECM              
      
                     
(8) 
                                                             
17 In 2009 Spanish public deficit reached a historical peak of 11.0% of GDP. 
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where D1t is a dummy variable taking value 0 from 1961 until T1-1 and 1 between T1 and 
T2-1 and D2t is a dummy variable taking value 0 from 1961 until T2-1 and 1 between T2 -
and T, being T1 and T2 the detected break dates.  
From the significant coefficients estimated using equation (8), we can compute for every 
country the short-term impact of debt on economic performance during each of the three 
regimes as:    
short-term effects in regime j=  
4
1 1
/ (1 ),
q p
j
i i
i i
 
 
   j=1,2,3   (9) 
The full estimations results are reported in Appendix 2, while the estimated short-term 
effects are presented in Table 4. As can be seen, we find very different results across central 
and peripheral countries.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Regarding central EA countries, with the exception of France, in countries where debt had 
a negative short-run effect on growth (Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands), these 
inverse relationships between debt and growth seem to strengthen throughout the detected 
regimes. However, in Germany and Finland (where debt had a positive short-run effect on 
growth), we only detect a positive relationship between these two variables during the first 
regime (i.e., before the first break point). Subsequently, from 1983 and 1991 onwards, debt 
also exerts a negative effect on growth in Germany and Finland respectively. 
Interestingly, in peripheral EA countries, although we found that the short-run effect was 
positive in Portugal and Spain, a positive relationship between debt and the real growth 
rate during the first regime is only found in the Spanish case. However, it is noticeable that 
in this economy, although the relationship changes to negative from 1993 until the end of 
the sample, its magnitude is very small (-0.016 and -0.029 in the second and third regime, 
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respectively). In the case of Portugal, we find a temporary positive coefficient after the first 
detected break (during the 1986-2002 period), followed by a further negative coefficient 
after the second break, reinforcing the inverse association between the variables under 
study from then on. Moreover, a small positive relationship (0.031) between debt and 
growth is also found in Ireland during the third regime (2007-2013) where, after an 
important deleveraging process, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached a value of 25% in 2007. 
Finally, in the other two peripheral EA countries (Italy and Greece), we find a negative 
relationship between the two examined variables not only in the short-term, but 
throughout the three examined regimes as well. This behaviour could be related to the fact 
that these two countries present the highest average debt-to-GDP ratio during the 1961-
2013 period (75% and 69% respectively). 
 [Insert Figures 1 around here] 
Figures 1a and 1b summarize the main results for peripheral and central EA countries 
respectively. Specifically they present for each EA country: (1) the two break points with 
the associated debt-to-GDP ratio and (2) the evolution of the marginal impact of sovereign 
debt ratio on economic growth in the three regimes into which the sample period is split.   
Figure 1a shows the existence of a positive relationship between the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio and economic growth in some sub-periods in three peripheral EA countries: Spain 
(from 1961 until 1992), Portugal (from 1986 until 2002), and Ireland (between 2007 and 
2013). Therefore, with the exception of Ireland, in the other two peripheral EA countries 
(which also registered a positive short-run effect), the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth only becomes negative from a debt-to-GDP ratio between 50% and 
60%. Moreover, again with the exception of Ireland, the highest detrimental marginal 
impact of public debt on peripheral countries’ economic performance takes place after the 
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second break point (mainly from 2007 to 2009, coinciding with the global financial crisis), 
with debt-to-GDP ratios that range from 55% (Spain and Portugal) to slightly above 100% 
(Italy and Greece), being Spain the peripheral country where the negative impact is lower 
during the crisis episode. 
The highest negative marginal impact also takes place after the second break date in three 
out of the six central EA countries (see Figure 1b). In Finland and the Netherlands, it 
occurs from 2007-2008 (with a debt-to-GDP level that ranges from 35% to 58%), while in 
Belgium it takes place from 2005 with debt-to-GDP levels above 90%.   
Therefore, our results seem to suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio at which public debt 
exerts the strongest negative impact on economic growth changes over time and across EA 
countries. In seven out of eleven countries, the negative impact is especially high in times 
of distress, but the associated debt ratio clearly differs across countries. Whilst in some 
countries it takes place at low ratios (e.g., at 35% in Finland), in others it occurs at very 
high values (90% in Belgium and above 100% in Italy and Greece). In addition, the highest 
negative marginal impact also differs across EA countries. The maximum negative values 
are observed in Italy and Belgium (-0.391 and -0.376), whilst the minimum is registered in 
Spain (-0.029).  
6. Concluding remarks 
Despite the severe sovereign debt crisis in the EA, few papers have examined the 
relationship between debt and growth for member states. The limited body of literature 
available lends support to the presence of a common debt threshold across EA countries 
and does not distinguish between short and long-run effects. To our knowledge, no strong 
case has yet been made for analysing the incidence of debt accumulation on economic 
growth taking into account the particular characteristics of each EA economy and 
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examining whether the effects differ depending on the time horizon, even though this 
potential heterogeneity has been stressed by the literature.   
This paper aims to fill this gap. Unlike previous studies in the EA, we do not make use of 
panel techniques but study cross-country differences in the debt-growth nexus both across 
EA countries and across time horizons using time series analyses. To this end, our 
empirical examination of 11 member states (both central and peripheral) during the 1961-
2013 period is based on the estimation, for each country, of a log-linearized Cobb–Douglas 
production function augmented with a debt stock term, by means of the ARDL testing 
approach to cointegration. 
As in every empirical analysis, the results must be regarded with caution since they are 
based on a set of countries over a certain period and a given econometric methodology. 
This is particularly true of the comparison of the results with those of previous papers, 
since we adopt a time series analysis instead of a panel data approach, and since we use an 
analytical framework based on a production function augmented with public debt instead 
of growth regressions augmented by public debt. Nonetheless, our findings are in 
concordance with the predominant view that the positive effect of debt on output is more 
likely to be felt in the short rather than in the long run. In particular, our empirical evidence 
suggests a negative effect of public debt on output in the long run. Thus, our results 
support previous reports indicating that high public debt tends to hamper growth by 
increasing uncertainty over future taxation, crowding out private investment, and 
weakening a country’s resilience to shocks (see, e.g., Krugman, 1988). However, they detect 
the possibility that a public debt increase may have a positive effect in the short run by 
raising the economy’s productive capacity and improving efficiency depending on the 
characteristics of the country and the final allocation of public debt. Specifically, this short-
run positive effect is found in Finland, Germany, Portugal and Spain, suggesting that in a 
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context of low rates of economic growth, the path of fiscal consolidation may differ across 
the different EA countries. When in the short run stability analysis we allow the coefficient 
estimates on the public debt variable to differ before and after two endogenously (data-
based) identified structural breaks, our results also indicate that debt exerts a positive effect 
on growth in the first regime in Finland, Germany and Spain (from 1961 until 1990, 1982 
and 1992 respectively); whilst a positive relationship is found in the second regime in the 
case of Portugal (between 1986 and 2002). In all cases, the positive relationship between a 
debt increase and economic growth is found when the indebtedness level is either low or 
moderate (i.e., in sustainable debt periods). Moreover, within EA peripheral countries, 
Spain is the one that presents the lowest negative relationship between debt and growth 
during the distress episode (-0.029).    
This issue is particularly relevant to policymakers because of its implications for the 
effectiveness of a common fiscal policy, in view of the pronounced differences in the 
responsiveness of output in the long and short run and across countries. These findings 
seem to corroborate the idea that there is no “one size fits all” definition of fiscal space but 
that, conversely, debt limits and fiscal space may be country-specific and depend on each 
country’s track record of adjustment (see, e. g., Ostry et al., 2010). 
Extensions from the present research might take a number of directions. First, it would be 
interesting to examine possible non-linear effects (smooth or sudden structural changes) 
using the time-series approach applied in this paper to detect further potential 
heterogeneities among EA countries, complementing the evidence from existing literature 
using panel data techniques. A second natural extension to the analysis presented in this 
paper would be to further explore the main determinants of the detected differences in the 
relationships between public debt and economic growth across countries, with special 
emphasis on the economic and institutional factors suggested in Kourtellos et al. (2013) and 
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in Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015). Both items are on our future research agenda. In view 
of the encouraging results presented in this paper, some optimism about the benefits of 
implementing these extensions seems justified. 
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Table 1. Long-run analysis 
 
Panel A:  Bound testing to cointegration 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
ARDL(p,q1,q2,q3,q4,q5) (4, 3, 3, 4, 4) (1, 2, 4, 4, 0) (1, 4, 3, 1, 2) (1, 0, 2, 4, 3) (2, 2, 1, 0, 2) (1, 3, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 1, 0, 0) (3, 2, 0, 4, 1) (1, 4, 3, 4, 4) (1, 3, 3, 0, 2) (1, 3, 2, 0, 3) 
F-statistic 6.815* 5.045** 5.035** 4.163** 6.007* 4.509** 4.612** 5.396* 6.773* 4.323** 4.350** 
t-statistic -5.291* -3.709** -3.822** -3.868** -4.702* -3.695** -3.744** -3.628** -4.286* -3.860** -4.064** 
Panel B: Long-run coefficients 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Intercept  
0.412* 
(3.033) 
0.398* 
(3.214) 
0.363* 
       (3.561) 
0.450* 
(3.621) 
0.463* 
(3.021) 
0.155* 
(3.021) 
0.274* 
(2.997) 
0.232* 
(3.143) 
0.322* 
(3.055) 
0.174* 
(3.034) 
0.162* 
(3.051) 
kt  
0.296* 
(6.628) 
0.396* 
(6.071) 
0.426* 
(5.665) 
0.429* 
(5.826) 
0.497* 
(5.488) 
0.245* 
(5.488) 
0.232* 
(6.172) 
0.312* 
(5.843) 
0.444* 
(6.287) 
0.330* 
(4.204) 
0.489* 
(7.400) 
lt  
0.328* 
(6.176) 
0.452* 
(7.788) 
0.411* 
(7.292) 
0.428* 
(3.835) 
0.520* 
(3.483) 
0.312* 
(3.483) 
0.395* 
(3.531) 
0.472* 
(6.375) 
0.358* 
(6.320) 
0.373* 
(2.942) 
0.324* 
(4.040) 
ht 
0.085* 
(2.892) 
0.421* 
(2.978) 
0.538* 
(4.138) 
0.507* 
(3.998) 
0.584* 
(2.932) 
0.346* 
(2.932) 
0.131* 
(3.124) 
0.142* 
(3.723) 
0.357* 
(4.198) 
0.205* 
(2.947) 
0.353* 
(3.395) 
dt 
-0.129* 
(-4.335) 
-0.062* 
(-5.512) 
-0.049* 
(-5.137) 
-0.544* 
(-5.867) 
-0.040*              
(-3.135) 
-0.079* 
(-3.135) 
-0.049*                
(-7.783) 
-0.083* 
(-6.723) 
-0.097* 
(-7.318) 
-0.354* 
(-6.336) 
-0.336* 
(-4.871) 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In Panel A,  p, q1, q2, q3, q4 and q5 denote respectively the optimal lag length for ∆yt-i, ∆kt-i, ∆lt-i, ∆ht-i and ∆dt-i in the UECM  model (4) without deterministic trend. 
 * and ** indicate that the calculated F- and t-statistics are above the upper critical bound at 1% and 5% respectively. 
 In Panel B, in the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, while * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2. Short-run analysis 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Δyt-1 
0.336*  
(4.959) 
      
0.125*  
(3.401) 
    
0.282 
(3.912)       
Δyt-2  
  0.227*  
(3.985) 
            
0.181 
(3.568)       
Δkt 
3.464* 
(7.112) 
2.923*  
(6.480) 
3.914*  
(5.974) 
0.548*  
(4.145) 
4.531* 
(6.254) 
4.149*  
(5.697) 
  
5.308  
(7.729) 
3.307 
(6.371) 
1.942* 
(5.932) 
3.138* 
(7.065)  
Δkt-1 
1.641*  
(3.228)  
1.968* 
(4.454) 
4.295* 
(6.552) 
  
2.949*  
(4.897) 
2.259* 
(4.486) 
4.149*  
(4.252) 
3.409*  
(6.699) 
2.119* 
(5.691) 
1.563* 
(3.544) 
1.134* 
(5.202) 
Δkt-2      
2.068* 
(3.829) 
          
0.895* 
(3.121) 
 0.868*  
(3.688)  
0.644*  
(3.052) 
Δlt 
 0.512*  
(4.211) 
0.545*  
(3.395) 
0.767*  
(5.370) 
2.707*  
(6.745) 
0.607* 
(5.009) 
 0.311* 
(3.213) 
0.595*  
(5.297) 
0.147*  
(3.991) 
  
0.479*  
(3.546)  
0.171* 
(3.320) 
Δlt-1                 
 0.097* 
(3.904) 
  
0.222* 
(3.431) 
Δlt-2     
0.149* 
(3.263) 
1.358* 
(3.237) 
          
0.428*  
(3.546)  
  
Δht      
1.208* 
(3.913) 
  
0.328*  
(3.528) 
        
0.265*  
(3.650) 
0.987* 
(3.705)  
Δht-1 
1.836* 
(3.897) 
2.125* 
(3.791) 
  
2.757*  
(3.448)  
    
3.662* 
(3.331) 
        
Δht-2   
1.874* 
(3.540) 
            
0.147* 
(3.904) 
    
Δht-3   
1.253* 
(3.544) 
          
0.808* 
(3.648) 
1.706* 
(4.305)  
    
Δdt 
-0.105*            
(-3.561) 
-0.186*            
(-4.346) 
        
-0.077*             
(-3.902) 
-0.077*            
(-3.530) 
    
0.030** 
(3.420)  
Δdt-1 
-0.117 * 
(-3.560) 
  
0.059*  
(4.950) 
-0.054*            
(-3.252) 
0.089*  
(3.326)  
-0.195*            
(-3.731) 
    
 -0.108*            
(-5.242) 
0.063*  
(3.187) 
  
Δdt-2                 
0.062* 
(3.105) 
  
0.037*  
(3.074) 
Δdt-3 
0.077* 
(3.060) 
              
0.015*  
(3.461) 
    
ECMt-1 
-0.518*            
(-7.540) 
-0.301*            
(-4.325) 
-0.543*             
(-5.060) 
-0.594*            
(-4.783) 
-0.543*             
(-5.791)  
-0.190*            
(-5.353) 
-0.175*            
(-6.854) 
-0.262*            
(-8.176) 
-0.359*            
(-7.943) 
-0.130*             
(-6.387) 
-0.176*             
(-6.016) 
Short-run effect of 
public debt 
-0.331* 
(-2.994) 
-0.186* 
(-4.346) 
0.059*  
(4.950) 
-0.054*            
(-3.252) 
0.375* 
(3.882) 
-0.195*            
(-3.732) 
-0.077*             
(-3.902) 
-0.143* 
(-3.714) 
-0.031* 
(-3.936) 
0.063*  
(3.187) 
0.067* 
(2.882) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.805 
 
0.699 
 
0.895 
 
0.625 
 
0.865 
 
0.823 
 
0.668 
 
0.893 
 
0.886 
 
0.726 
 
0.821 
DW Test 2.104 2.168 2.181 2.070 2.073 2.017 1.988 1.987 2.213 2.164 2.105 
χ2N  
1.363 
[0.506] 
0.719 
[0.698] 
1.834 
[0.400] 
1.028 
[0.598] 
1.770 
[0.413] 
1.664 
[0.435] 
0.443 
[0.801] 
0.913 
[0.634] 
2.615 
[0.271] 
1.345 
[0.510] 
2.986 
[0.225] 
χ2SC 
0.440 
[0.802] 
1.636 
[0.441] 
0.694 
[0.707] 
2.775 
[0.250] 
2.086 
[0.352] 
1.777 
[0.411] 
2.695 
[0.260] 
5.531 
[0.063] 
4.088 
[0.130] 
2.374 
[0.305] 
2.326 
[0.313] 
χ2H 
6.783 
[0.746] 
8.774 
[0.554] 
8.374 
[0.398] 
11.612 
[0.151] 
8.899 
[0.351] 
2.715 
[0.744] 
6.677 
[0.246] 
13.369 
[0.100] 
11.771 
[0.540] 
4.897 
[0.769] 
10.292 
[0.327] 
  
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown. 
 The short-run effects of public debt are calculated using equation (7) 
 * and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial 
correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated 
probability values are given. 
 
 
33 
 
Table 3: Results of the structural changes test in the coefficient of the public debt  
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Structural 
break 1 
  
1987   
(58%) 
1977 
(60%) 
1991 
(22%) 
1986 
(31%) 
1983 
(39%) 
1979 
(23%) 
1988 
 (107%) 
1976 
(56%) 
1978 
(41%) 
1986 
(57%) 
1993 
(52%) 
Structural 
break 2 
 2007  
 (60%) 
 2005  
 (92%) 
 2007  
 (35%) 
 2005  
 (67%) 
 2008  
 (67%) 
 2008  
 (113%) 
 2007  
 (25%) 
 2007  
 (106%) 
 2008  
 (58%) 
 2003  
 (56%) 
 2009  
 (54%) 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets, the associated levels of public debt-to-GDP ratio are given. 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Short-run analysis with structural breaks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown. 
In the square brackets, the sample period for each regime is given. 
 The short-run effects of public debt on economic growth are calculated using equations (7) and (8)  
 * and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
   
Central EA countries Short-term Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Austria 
-0.331* 
(-2.994) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.119* 
(-3.393) 
[1961-1986] 
-0.158* 
(-3-011) 
[1987-2006] 
-0.074* 
(-3.082) 
[2007-2013] 
Belgium 
-0.186** 
(-4.346) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.295** 
(-3.945) 
[1961-1976] 
-0.271** 
(-2.740) 
[1977-2004] 
-0.376* 
(-3.842) 
[2005-2013] 
Finland 
0.059* 
(4.950) 
[1961-2013] 
0.074* 
(3.6448) 
[1961-1990] 
-0.036* 
(-3.067) 
[1991-2006] 
-0.037* 
(-3.741) 
[2007-2013] 
France 
-0.054* 
(-3.252) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.062* 
(-3.149) 
[1961-1985] 
-0.030* 
(-2.951) 
[1986-2004] 
-0.014* 
(-3.287) 
[2005-2013] 
Germany 
0.375* 
(3.882) 
[1961-2013] 
0.308* 
(4.117) 
[1961-1982] 
-0.106* 
(-3.696) 
[1983-2007] 
-0.044* 
(-4.358) 
[2008-2013] 
Netherlands 
-0.031* 
(-3.936) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.027* 
(-3.643) 
[1961-1977] 
-0.008* 
(-3.200) 
[1978-2007] 
-0.037* 
(-2.918) 
[2008-2013] 
Peripheral EA countries Short-term Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Greece 
-0.195* 
(-3.732) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.017* 
(-3.874) 
[1961-1978] 
-0.052* 
(-3.701) 
[1979-2007] 
-0.255* 
(-2.933) 
[2008-2013] 
Ireland 
-0.077* 
(-3.902) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.090** 
(-2.740) 
[1961-1987] 
-0.137* 
(-3.624) 
[1988-2006] 
0.031* 
(-2.870) 
[2007-2013] 
Italy 
-0.143* 
(-3.714) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.143* 
(-3.526) 
[1961-1975] 
-0.098* 
(-3-702) 
[1976-2006] 
-0.391* 
(-3.689) 
[2007-2013] 
Portugal 
0.063* 
(3.187) 
[1961-2013] 
-0.056* 
(3.160) 
[1961-1985] 
0.097** 
 (2.813) 
[1986-2002] 
-0.174* 
(-2.971) 
[2003-2013] 
Spain 
0.067* 
(2.882) 
[1961-2013] 
0.072* 
(2.997) 
[1961-1992] 
-0.016** 
(-2.805) 
[1993-2008] 
-0.029* 
(-2.945) 
[2009-2013] 
Figure 1a: Debt-growth relationship in peripheral EA countries 
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Figure 1b: Debt-growth relationship in central EA countries 
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Source: AMECO, IMF and own estimates.
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Appendix 1: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Level of Output (Yt) Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices Annual Macroeconomic Database-
European Commission (AMECO) 
Capital Stock (Kt) Net capital stock at 2010 market prices, total economy AMECO 
Accumulated public debt 
(Dt) 
General government consolidated gross debt at 2010 
market prices 
AMECO and International 
Monetary Fund 
Labour input (Lt) Civilian employment AMECO 
Human capital (Ht) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
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Appendix 2: Short-run estimations results with structural breaks 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Δyt-1 
0.336*  
(2.955) 
      
0.134*  
(3.510) 
    
0.301 
 (4.016)   
    
Δyt-2  
  0.263**  
(2.714) 
            
0.191 
 (3.828)   
    
Δkt 
3.296*  
(6.242) 
2.769*  
(6.349) 
3.987*  
(5.979) 
0.538*  
(4.613) 
4.673* 
(6.649) 
3.948*  
(4.990) 
  
5.324   
(7.021) 
3.335 
 (6.786) 
1.788*  
(5.511) 
3.159*  
(7.199)  
Δkt-1 
1.432*   
(2. 870)  
1.923*  
(4.486) 
4.308* 
(6.226) 
  
3.409*  
(4.082) 
2.159* 
(4.332) 
1.688*  
(4.550) 
3.388*  
(6.658) 
2.154*  
(4.833) 
1.474*  
(3.458) 
1.129*  
(5.377) 
Δkt-2      
2.113* 
(3.787) 
          
0.918*  
(3.167) 
 0.928*  
(3.625)  
0.699*  
(3.064) 
Δlt 
 0.575*  
(4.211) 
0.592*  
(3.787) 
0.697*  
(4.256) 
2.706*  
(6.613) 
0.619* 
(3.741) 
 0.379* 
(3.762) 
0.557*  
(4.890) 
0.083*  
(3.578) 
  
0.448*  
(3.256)  
0.200*  
(3.018) 
Δlt-1                 
 0.105* 
(3.572) 
  
0.226*  
(3.367) 
Δlt-2     
0.103* 
(3.002) 
1.330* 
(3.047) 
          
0.507*  
(3.240)  
  
Δht      
1.299* 
(3.349) 
  
0.270*  
(3.741) 
        
0.293*  
(3.621) 
0.990*  
(3.317)  
Δht-1 
1.843** 
(2.834) 
1.681*  
(2.998) 
  
2.701*  
(3.286)  
    
4.783*  
(3.758 
        
Δht-2   
1.426** 
(2.672) 
            
0.186*  
(3.808) 
    
Δht-3   
0.822** 
(2.655) 
          
0.779*  
(3.580) 
1.730* 
 (3.715)  
    
Δdt 
-0.131*            
(-3.634) 
-0.295*            
(-3.945) 
        
-0.090*             
(-3.740) 
-0.077*            
(-3.431) 
    
0.023* 
 (3.317)  
ΔdtD1t 
0.0450*            
(2.964) 
-0.271*            
(-3.892) 
        
-0.137*             
(-3.627) 
-0.052*            
(-3.524) 
    
0.031*  
(2.867)  
ΔdtD2t 
-0.078*            
(-3.182) 
-0.376*            
(-3.892) 
        
0.031*             
(2.870) 
-0.210*            
(-2.991) 
    
-0.019*  
(-3.159)  
Δdt-1 
0.148* 
(3.695) 
  
0.074*  
(3.648) 
-0.062*            
(-3.148) 
-0.093*   
(-3.359)  
-0.017*            
(-3.874) 
    
 -0.090*            
(-4.751) 
-0.056*  
 (-3.160) 
  
Δdt-1D1t 
-0.090* 
(-3.124) 
  
-0.036*   
(-3.067) 
-0.030*            
(-2.951) 
-0.039*   
(-3.960)  
-0.052*            
(-3.701) 
    
 -0.022*            
(-3.777) 
0.097**  
(2.813) 
  
Δdt-1D2t 
-0.021* 
(-2.903) 
 
  
-0.0365*   
(-3.741) 
-0.014*            
(-3.287) 
-0.044*   
(-3.665)  
-0.255*            
(-2.933) 
    
 -0.014*            
(-2.999) 
-0.174*   
(-2.971) 
  
Δdt-2                 
0.048*  
(3.176) 
  
0.048*  
(2.862) 
Δdt-2D1t                 
-0.009*  
(-2.945) 
  
-0.047**  
(2.744) 
Δdt-2D2t                 
-0.022** 
(2.831) 
  
-0.011**  
(-2.731) 
Δdt-3 
-0.065*  
(-2.849) 
              
0.015*  
(3.004) 
    
Δdt-3D1t 
-0.023*  
(-2.944) 
              
0.024*  
(2.878) 
    
Δdt-3D2t 
0.069*  
(3.161) 
              
-0.001*   
(-2.925) 
    
ECMt-1 
-0.529*            
(-6.984) 
-0.391*            
(-4.461) 
-0.563*             
(-4.915) 
-0.611*            
(-4.886) 
-0.548*             
(-5.892)  
-0.176*            
(-5.219) 
-0.281*            
(-6.973) 
-0.255*            
(-8.182) 
-0.364*            
(-5.589) 
-0.139*             
(-6.988) 
-0.279*             
(-3.638) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.837 
 
0.734 
 
0.897 
 
0.650 
 
0.868 
 
0.841 
 
0.673 
 
0.904 
 
0.892 
 
0.746 
 
0.849 
DW Test 2.291 2.143 2.151 2.110 2.029 2.011 2.018 2.121 2.205 2.119 2.132 
χ2N  
0.816  
[0.665] 
0.734 
[0.641] 
1.466 
 [0.480] 
1.058 
[0.589] 
1.199 
[0.430] 
1.844 
[0.398] 
0.483 
 [0.786] 
1.146 
 [0.564] 
3.036  
[0.219] 
1.513  
[0.469] 
1.381 
 [0.471] 
χ2SC 
1.048 
 [0.368] 
1.173  
[0.415] 
0.847  
[0.439] 
1.400 
[0.258] 
2.080 
[0.137] 
0.493 
[0.671] 
1.946  
[0.155] 
1.998 
 [0.150] 
4.400 
[0.145] 
0.050 
 [0.9512] 
0.028 
 [0.973] 
χ2H 
14.485  
[0.563] 
13.785 
 [0.183] 
9.255  
[0.351] 
12.832 
[0.145] 
8.419 
[0.394] 
6.783 
[0.452] 
9.004  
[0.252] 
10.261 
[0.418] 
20.247 [0.209] 
8.338 
 [0.569] 
10.122  
[0.684 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown. 
 The short-run effects of public debt are calculated using equation (7) 
 * and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
χ2N, χ
2
SC and χ
2
H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for 
heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
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